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Florida Maritime Accident Lawyer

Maritime Law Applies in State Court Actions

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Editor: Rod Sullivan
Profession: Maritime Attorney

February 07, 2007

By Rod Sullivan

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Category: General

I am sometimes surprised that State Courts, as Courts of general jurisdiction, have difficulty with the concept that they are required to apply the maritime law of the United States in actions brought before them dealing with maritime cases, even it it conflicts with their own state law. Here are some cases which may help explain why that it so:

When Does Maritime Law Apply?

Torts committed within the boundaries of maritime jurisdiction are subject to maritime law. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 628, 1959 AMC 597, 599 (1959). For example, the storage and maintenance of a boat on a marina on navigable waters is substantially related to traditional maritime activity and hence maritime law applies, even if the case is brought in a State Court. Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (U.S. 1990).


The Reverse-Erie Doctrine: Where Maritime Law and State Law Conflict, State Courts must apply Maritime Law

The 'saving to suitors' clause [28 U.S.C. Section 1333] allows state courts to entertain in personam maritime causes of action, but in such cases the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is constrained by a so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal maritime standards." Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 1986 AMC 2113 (1986); quoting Madruga v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 1954 AMC 405 (1954), quoting Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 1924 AMC 418 (1924).
Exxon Corp. v. Chick Kam Choo, 1988 AMC 923, 817 F.2d 307 (5 Cir. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 1988 AMC 1817 (1988), contains an instructive discussion of the Reverse-Erie doctrine. The Fifth Circuit stated:


We reject this facile syllogism; drawing conclusions from metaphors is dangerous. The reason that state court procedures are not pre-empted by maritime law is that they almost never ... conflict with it. When they do, however, it is clear that they must yield.

Because the Erie diversity doctrine and the "reverse-Erie" maritime doctrine spring from distinct principles and policies, there is no reason to expect a perfect symmetry between them. In the Erie context, the substance/procedure dichotomy is simply shorthand for distinctions that must be drawn on the basis of policies underlying the doctrine. The "reverse-Erie" question is whether the inconsistent state law, whether deemed a matter of substance or procedure, conflicts with maritime law.

The Maritime Law has long Applied Joint and Several Liability

The rule of law is, that when a third party has sustained an injury to his property from the cooperating consequences of two causes, though the persons producing them may not be in intentional concert to occasion such a result, the injured person is entitled to compensation for his loss from either one or both of them, The Steamer New Philadelphia, 66 U.S. 62, 76 (U.S. 1862). Such a result can never be sanctioned by the justices of this court, so long as they adhere to the rule that when a third party has sustained an injury to his property, from the co-operating consequences of two causes, though the persons producing them may not be in intentional concert to occasion such a result, the injured person is entitled to compensation for his loss from either one or both of them, according to the circumstances of the incident. The New Philadelphia, 1 Black, 76; Boyer v. Sturgis, 24 How. 122. "The Atlas", 93 U.S. 302, 318-319 (U.S. 1876).

The Pennsylvania Rule Applies to Non-Collision Cases in Admiralty

In United States v. Nassau Marine, 778 F.2d 1111 (5 Cir. 1985), the court articulated a test for determining when to apply the presumption of the Pennsylvania Rule. That Court held that three elements must exist: (1) proof by a preponderance of the evidence of violation of a statute or regulation that imposes a mandatory duty: (2) the statute or regulation must involve marine safety or navigation; and (3) the injury suffered must be of a nature that the statute or regulation was intended to prevent. Id. at 1116-1117; Folkstone Maritime v. CSX Corporation, 1995 AMC 2705, 2716, 64 F.3d 1037, 1047 (7 Cir. 1995). If each of these criteria are satisfied, a party is entitled to a presumption that a statutory violation of a defendant caused, or at least contributed to, the injury or damage complained of.
In Nautilus Motor Tanker Limitation Proceedings, 1996 AMC 2308, 2317-2318 (3rd Cir 1996) the Court found that the plaintiff has proven a statutory violation and agreed with plaintiff's contention that the Pennsylvania Rule is applicable to non-collision cases such as the instant matter before the Court. See In re Seaboard Shipping Corp., 449 F.2d 132, 136, 1971 AMC 2145, 2152 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949, 92 S. Ct. 2038-39, 32 L. Ed. 2d 337 (1972); Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 78 S. Ct. 394, 2 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1958); The Denali, 112 F.2d 952 (9th Cir. 1940).
In the fire fighting arena the Fifth Circuit has specifically found the Pennsylvania Rule to be applicable. Pennzoil Producing Co. v. Offshore Express, Inc., 943 F.2d 1465, 1472 (5th Cir. 1991)

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